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I. INTRODUCTION
People love the ability to control their phones by a simple voice
command of "OK Google" or "Siri," but often do not realize that it
necessarily requires the phone to be always listening for those trigger
words. This voice command technology spread into consumers' homes
via products like the Samsung Smart TV, Amazon Echo, and Mi-
crosoft's Xbox. Just like with Google's OK Google or Apple's Siri,
these products take voice commands and are always listening for the
trigger words. The advent of these always-listening technologies pre-
sents multiple new problems. After discussing exactly how the Ama-
zon Echo, the Samsung Smart TV, and Microsoft's Xbox function, this
paper investigates the problems presented in two areas: government
listening and corporate listening.
The Government Listening section begins a discussion of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) and the National Security
Agency's (NSA) abilities to remotely access microphones in citizens'
cell phones. This serves as the situational analogy for the possibility
that arises from these in-home always-listening technologies that are
also heavily reliant on microphones. Following that is an analysis of
Fourth Amendment law, beginning with a discussion of the evils the
Fourth Amendment sought to eliminate - general warrants and writs
of assistance.. Olmstead v. United States, Katz v. United States, and
Berger v. State of New York lead the discussion on how the United
States Supreme Court addresses privacy concerns in the face of new-
at-the-time technologies and what exactly can be protected by the
Fourth Amendment. The ultimate question posed in this section is
whether the fact that these technologies are almost exclusively used
within one's home - a classic Fourth Amendment area of protection -
changes the legality of any potential government surveillance, and how
a court might view these technologies.
In the Corporate Listening section, the recent Samsung Smart
TV scandal serves as an example of what privacy concerns arise from
these technologies even absent government eavesdropping. By virtue
of being able to respond to voice command, these devices are neces-
sarily always waiting to hear certain trigger words. Samsung's privacy
policy informed customers to be cognizant when discussing "sensitive
information" around the device, as anything discussed around the de-
vice may be collected among the data reported to third-party compa-
nies. After outrage ensued from its users, Samsung amended its policy.
This speaks to the paradox created between consumers' desire to have
hyper-convenient technology in every aspect of life, and their unwill-
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ingness to accept that these desired technologies may necessarily re-
quire companies to be listening to them. The other problem presented
by corporate listening stems from the Fourth Amendment and the
third-party doctrine. This section will discuss what the third-party doc-
trine means for always-listening technologies and the uncertain future
of the doctrine itself.
II. THE ALWAYS-LISTENING TECHNOLOGIES
A. How Does the Technology Work?
Each of these three technologies - Amazon Echo, Samsung
Smart TV, and Xbox - works in a fairly similar manner. All of the
devices rely on microphones that are always waiting to hear a com-
mand from its owners, as each requires the user to employ a trigger
word to activate the device. Only upon hearing the trigger word will
the device respond to the request. For instance, an owner cannot just
ask aloud whether the Sacramento Kings won the latest game, but must
preface the question with "Alexa" when using the Amazon Echo.'
Amazon Echo is built to be one's very own personal assistant.
Once the owner employs the trigger word, the device will follow a lit-
any of commands. Amazon's website has a non-exhaustive list of var-
ious commands one could give it, including questions it can answer for
the owner. For example, an owner can ask the device for the weather
in any given city, or for the statistics for a favorite sports team.2 The
product page boasts that it is "hands-free and always on" and can hear
commands from the other side of the room even when music is playing,
all thanks to its seven microphones.3 When the device hears the trigger
word, it streams the audio to the cloud where Amazon's software iden-
tifies the command and responds accordingly.4 Also streamed to the
cloud is the "fraction of a second of audio before" the trigger word.
The seven microphones can be turned off using a button on the device
itself, but it will still respond to commands made with the device's
What is Amazon Echo, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/dp/BOOX4WHP5E
(last visited Mar. 31, 2017). Each of these three devices responds to its own trigger
word.
2Id
3id.
4 Id.
5 Alexa and Amazon Echo FAQs, AMAZON, https://www.ama-
zon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeld=201602230 (last visited Mar. 31,
2017).
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remote. 6 The microphones will only turn on again once the button is
pushed another time.7
Samsung's Smart TV responds to commands in two different
ways. The distinction lies in whether the command can be processed
locally, or whether it must go through a server. The first situation relies
on the microphone within the television itself, which can process "pre-
determined" commands.8 These commands include things like chang-
ing the volume or the channel. The second situation relies on the mi-
crophone inside the television's remote.9 The command is one that was
not "predetermined" but instead involves a search requiring the
server. For example, someone could use the microphone in the re-
mote to make a more specific command like recommending a good
romantic comedy.' 1 Samsung asserts this kind of search is akin to one
done by any other device using voice recognition software.12
The Xbox Kinect is an addition to the Xbox gaming console
that allows users to use the device's camera and microphone to log in
with facial recognition, control their televisions, change the channel or
the game they are playing, and many other personalized features.1 3 The
device responds to the trigger word "Xbox" followed by a command.14
The universe of commands it responds to is more geared toward video
games and television controls, but it can also run an internet search if
the commands "Xbox Bing" or "Browse to" are used, followed by the
website." Some of the commands given to the device are processed
locally and the command does not get transmitted outside of the de-
vice.1 Microsoft captures the voice command given to the Xbox,
6 id.
7id.
Natasha Lomas, Samsung Edits Orwellian Clause Out of TV Privacy Policy,
TECH CRUNCH (Feb. 10, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/02/10/smarttv-pri-
vacy/#.puzvmzo:yfMB.
9 Id.
10 Id.
1 Id.
I 2 Id.
Kinect for Xbox One, XBOX, http://www.xbox.com/en-US/xbox-
one/accessories/kinect-for-xbox-one (last visited Mar. 15, 2017).
I4 Id.
1 Xbox Wire Staff, The Complete List ofKinect Gesture and Voice Commands
For Your Referencing Pleasure, XBOX (Nov. 26, 2013, 12:02 AM),
http://news.xbox.com/2013/11/26/xbox-one-kinect-gesture-and-voice-guide/.
16 Kinect Xbox One Privacy FAQ, XBOX,
http://news.xbox.com/2013/11/26/xbox-one-kinect-gesture-and-voice-guide/ (last
visited Mar. 31, 2017).
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"along with any ambient background noise."l 7 Additionally, the user
can decide to deactivate the microphones for the purposes of voice
commands, but still opt to use the microphones to chat with other gain-
18
ers.
B. Why These Technologies Can be Analogized to Cell Phones
The relevant underlying technology of both cell phones and the
in-home, always-listening devices are microphones. As will be dis-
cussed below, reports of the United States government spying on its
own citizens via citizens' cell phones explained that it was done by
remotely turning on the microphones within the cell phone. Even if the
cell phone was turned off, the government was still able to remotely
access the phone, turn on the microphone without alerting the phone's
owner, and listen to whatever was occurring around it.
Accordingly, these in-home, always-listening devices may be
just as susceptible to government intrusion by virtue of their heavy re-
liance on microphones. The key difference between the cell phones
already known to be accessible by the government and the in-home,
always-listening technologies that are gaining popularity today is that
the latter are predominantly used in one's home. This difference will
be discussed in more detail below, but insofar as the underlying tech-
nology is concerned, however, the two groups are substantially similar.
III. GOVERNMENT LISTENING
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons;
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no war-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized1
The Fourth Amendment has been held to protect or prohibit
many different things. In Olmstead v. United States, the Supreme
Court held the Fourth Amendment did not extend so far as to protect20
government surveillance absent physical trespass on one's property.
In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court overruled Olmstead and
'7 Id.
18 Id.
1 U.S. Const. amend. IV.
20 Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
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instead held the Fourth Amendment to protect people, not places.21 As
technology advances, the Supreme Court must continue to update what
is protected by the Fourth Amendment as to allow the Constitution to
adapt to modem times.
A. Reports ofNSA and FBI Remote Hacking of Cell Phones
Reports of the government eavesdropping via microphones are
not new. In 2006, CNET reported that the FBI used the "novel form of
electronic surveillance" during a criminal investigation by remotely
activating the microphone of a suspect's cell phone to listen in on con-
versations.22 The report stated that the eavesdropping could occur re-
gardless of whether the phone was on; the phone's microphone would
only be inaccessible if the battery was removed.2 3 Verizon Wireless
did not directly comment on the remote eavesdropping for CNET's
article, but said that the company "works closely with law enforce-
ment" and complies with legal orders.2 4
Seven years later, reports of the government remotely access-
ing microphones were still in the headlines. The Wall Street Journal
reported the FBI had the ability to remotely activate the microphone
on lapto s and Android devices without the user knowing that it is hap-
pening. The FBI reportedly uses such a technique when investigating
organized crime, child pornography, or terrorism, but refrains from do-
ing so when investigating hackers due to fear that the technique would
be discovered and subsequently publicized. 2 6 In cases where the mi-
crophones on laptops or Android devices are remotely accessed, the
FBI attempts to ensure that only relevant information is collected. In
doing so, however, an FBI "screening team" must go through all of the
collected data to determine what is relevant. 2 8 While the Wall Street
Journal's report was specific to laptops and Android devices, other
websites reported that the NSA has been able to, inter alia, remotely
21 Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
22 Declan McCullagh, FBI taps cell phone mic as eavesdropping tool, CNET
(Dec. 4, 2006, 6:56 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/fbi-taps-cell-phone-mic-as-
eavesdropping-tool.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Jennifer Valentino-Devries & Danny Yadron, FBI Taps Hacker Tactics to Spy
on Suspects, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 3, 2013, 3:17 PM), http://www.wsj.com/arti-
cles/SB10001424127887323997004578641993388259674.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
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access the microphone on the iPhone since 2008.29
In 2014, CNN reported on the NSA's hacking of cell phones
after Edward Snowden spoke about it in an interview on NBC with
Brian Williams. 3 0 CNN's article included an explanation on how this
technology works, courtesy of former members of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, Navy SEALs, and consultants to the military's cyber
warfare team:
Government spies can set up their own miniature cell network
tower. Your phone automatically connects to it. Now, that tower's ra-
dio waves send a command to your phone's antennae: the baseband
chip. That tells your phone to fake any shutdown and stay on. A smart
hack won't keep your phone running at 100%, though. Spies could
keep your phone on standby and just use the microphone - or send
pings announcing your location.3 1
The article reported that the NSA relies on these tactics on a
"specified list of terrorists and foreign fighters" rather than on the av-
erage person.32 However, it noted that the FBI uses these surveillance
techniques domestically for investigations of many various crimes.
B. Government Surveillance and The Fourth Amendment
The United States Supreme Court has an inconsistent past in
deciding what is and what is not protected under the Fourth Amend-
ment.3 4 The confusion stems from the very obvious problem that when
the Constitution was drafted, the Founding Fathers could not have pos-
sibly imagined the future of technology. When the Fourth Amendment
was drafted, the threat of government intrusion came from general
warrants and writs of assistance. 3 5 General warrants were used by the
King before the American Revolution and allowed officers to search
29 Chris Smith, Yikes: NSA can turn on your iPhone's camera, mic without you
knowing, BRG (Dec. 31, 2013, 7:45 AM), http://bgr.com/2013/12/31/nsa-iphone-
hack/; The NSA's Spy Catalog, SPIEGEL (Dec. 30, 2013, 3:18 PM), http://www.spie-
gel.de/intemational/world/a-941262.html.
30 Jose Pagliery, How the NSA can 'turn on'your phone remotely, CNN (June
6, 2014, 8:03 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/06/06/technology/security/nsa-turn-
on-phone/.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 See, e.g., Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438 (1928); see contra Katz v. U.S., 389
U.S. 347 (1967).
3 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 463.
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unspecific places and seize unspecified persons.36 Such were often
used by the King to silence dissenters.37 Writs of assistance allowed
officers to search any place based merely on his own suspicion.38 Es-
pecially concerning was that writs of assistance lasted the duration of
the King or Queen's life.39 General warrants and writs of assistance
were the predominant concerns for the drafters of the Fourth Amend-
ment, but as stated by Justice Brandeis in his dissent in Olmstead v.
United States, general warrants and writs of assistance "are but puny
instruments of tyranny and oppression when compared with wire tap-
ping."4 0
The problem of an unknown future plagues the Supreme Court
just as it plagued the Founding Fathers. It is impossible to plan for
something that has not yet been conceptualized. For that reason, Fourth
Amendment case law is akin to a patchwork quilt; the Supreme Court
fixes one problem created by technology at a time, largely without con-
sidering what will come next or how one decision will affect privacy
implications presented by later technologies. For example, when deal-
ing with the question of whether police can use GPS trackers on sus-
pects, Justice Sotomayor criticized the majority's opinion in her con-
currence for being short-sighted, stating that "[i]n cases of electronic
or other novel means of surveillance that do not depend upon a physi-
cal invasion on property the majority opinion's trespassory test may
provide little guidance.'"
In 1928, the Supreme Court decided Olmstead v. United States,
in which the defendants challenged the constitutionality of evidence
obtained by the government through the wiretaping of several prop-
erties over the course of almost five months. The defendants and
seventy-two other people were indicted after the wiretapping evidence
revealed a large-scale operation of unlawfully importing, possessing,
and selling liquor within the United States. 4 4 Olmstead was in charge
of the operation and received half of the profits gained.4 5 Federal
agents placed wiretaps along the telephone wires from four of the de-
36 The Honorable M. Blane Michael, Reading the Fourth Amendment: Guidance
From the Mischief that Gave It Birth, 85 N.Y.U. L. REv. 905, 909 (2010).
37 d.
3 Id. at 907.39 id.
40 Olmstead, 277 U.S..at 476 (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
41 U.S. v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J. concurring).
42 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 455-57.
43 Id. at 471 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
44 Id. at 455 (majority opinion).
41 Id. at 456.
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fendants' residences and from the operation's main office without tres-
passing upon the defendants' respective properties. 4 6 The Supreme
Court opined that the "well-known historical purpose of the Fourth
Amendment, directed against general warrants and writs of assistance,
was to prevent the use of governmental force to search a man's house,
his person, his papers, and his effects, and to prevent their seizure
against his will."4 The Court ultimately determined that the wiretap-
ping used against Olmstead was not prohibited by the Fourth Amend-
ment because there was no searching or seizing, and was obtained only
by hearing, without entering the defendants' offices or houses.48 The
Court opined that holding otherwise would five an ",enlarged and un-
usual meaning to the Fourth Amendment." 4
Almost forty years later, Olmstead was overruled by Katz v.
United States, but Justice Brandeis's dissent in Olmstead went on to
become one of the most influential opinions regarding privacy and the
Fourth Amendment. In his dissent, Justice Brandeis admitted that
when the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were adopted, their purposes
were obvious because the government "could secure possession of
[man's] papers and other articles incident to his private life-a seizure
effect, if need be, by breaking and entry., 5 0 Because that was the gov-
ernment's only option, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments' specific lan-
guage protected against "such invasion of 'the sanctities of a man's
home and privacies of life'...,,"1 Justice Brandeis then noted that as
time progressed, inventions made it possible for the government to ob-
tain "what is whispered in the closet" and that progress is unlikely to
stop with wiretapping. 52 He further explained that when the govern-
ment uses a wiretap on someone's telephone, it is also "tapping the
telephone of every other person whom he may call, or who may call
him." 53 He opined that people are quick to notice when their liberties
are infringed by "evil-minded rulers;" thus, the greatest danger to lib-
erty comes from the "insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-
meaning but without understanding." 54
46 Id. at 457.
47 Id. at 463 (emphasis added).
48 Id. at 464.
49 Id. at 466.
50 Id. at 473 (Brandeis, J. dissent).
5' Id.
52 Id.
53Id. at 476.
54 Id. at 479.
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Katz again presented the Supreme Court with the issue of gov-
ernmental wiretapping. 5 Federal agents placed a wiretap on a public
phone booth where they believed the defendant was making phone
calls. 5 6 The primary debate was whether the phone booth qualified as
a "constitutionally protected area."57 Rejecting the premise of the de-
bate, the Supreme Court instead held that the Fourth Amendment pro-
tects people, not places. The Court overruled Olmstead by holding
that there was no constitutional significance given to the fact that the
wiretap did not physically go inside the phone booth. 5 9 The Court fur-
ther explained that what someone knowingly exposes to the public is
not protected by the Fourth Amendment, but that what someone "seeks
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected." 6 0 As applied to Katz, the Court found that
even though he used a public phone booth, he had entered the booth in
an attempt to exclude the "uninvited ear." 61 Justice Harlan wrote an
influential concurrence in which he delivered a test for protection: an
actual, subjective expectation of privacy, and an objective, reasonable
expectation of privacy.6 2
In Berger v. State ofNew York, the Supreme Court considered
the constitutionality of a New York statute permitting electronic eaves-
63dropping. The statute in question allowed a court to issue an exparte
order to eavesdrop based on the word of a district attorney, the attor-
ney-general, or "an officer above the rank of sergeant of any police
department of the state or of any political subdivision thereof." 4 The
statute required that the oath stated a reasonable ground to believe ev-
idence of a crime would be obtained, that it particularly described the
person(s) who would be eavesdropped upon, the purpose of doing so,
and the particular phone number or telegraph line involved.6 5 Although
the statute required the identification of the person subject to the war-
rant, the Court opined that said requirement "does no more than iden-
tify the person who constitutionally protected area is to be invaded ra-
ther than 'particularly describing' the communications, conversations,
Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
5 1Id. at 349.
17 Id. at 351.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 353.
601 Id. at 351.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 361.
63 Berger v. State of New York, 388 U.S. 41, 44 (1967).
64 Id. at 54.
65 Id.
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or discussions to be seized." 66 Additionally, the statute allowed eaves-
dropping for two months, and the possibility of an extension thereafter,
based on the single, original showing of cause. 67 The statute also did
not provide a termination procedure in the event that the information
sought was obtained within the two month time period, which the court
opined left too much to the sole discretion of the officer. 68 Lastly, the
Court took issue with a warrant being issued without any notice being
given to the suspect because of the necessity for secrecy, but no re-
quirement for a showing of exigency, as would be required of a tradi-
tional warrant.6 9
C. The Significance ofBeing "In-Home" Technologies
As noted above, the always-listening technologies can be anal-
ogized to cell phones for the purposes of discussing exactly how the
government may use them as surveillance tools in the future. However,
the always-listening technologies discussed in this paper have one cru-
cial difference from cell phones that may change how they are treated
under the Fourth Amendment: they almost exclusively reside in one's
home. That means that these devices do not travel with their owners
into public spaces. Traditionally, homes and what occurs therein have
been treated as sacred with regard to the Fourth Amendment. Such was
illustrated in the Supreme Court's analysis in Kyllo v. United States.
In Kyllo, the Supreme Court decided whether the use of a ther-
mal imager on a person's home was considered a search under the
Fourth Amendment. 70 Justice Scalia wrote the opinion and heavily em-
phasized both the nature of the home under the Fourth Amendment and
the intimate nature of the information obtained by using the device.71
The Court noted that, "[a]t the very core' of the Fourth Amendment
'stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free
from unreasonable governmental intrusion." 72 It referred to the interior
of the home as the prototypical area of protection. 73 Allowing this tech-
66Id. at 59.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 59-60.
69 Id. at 60.
70 Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).
7' Id. at 31-39.
72 Id. at 31 (citations omitted) (quotations omitted).
7 Id. at 34.
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nology to fall outside of a "search" would be to permit police technol-
ogy to lessen the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.7 4 JUS-
tice Scalia also emphasized that the information obtained was intimate
as the thermal imager might inform the police "at what hour each night
the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath." 7 5 The Court also
noted that thermal imaging technology is largely used only by police
rather than being in general public use.7 6 Considering all of these
points, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision and held that
using the thermal imager constituted a "search" and was unreasonable
without a warrant. 77
The Supreme Court's logic in Kyllo would likely vary a bit if
applied to the always-listening technologies. The biggest difference
between the two technologies is that the thermal imager was largely
used only by police, whereas the always-listening technologies are spe-
cifically marketed for general public use. The devices are bought by
consumers and voluntarily placed in the owners' homes. However, the
Court would likely find protection under the Fourth Amendment for
these devices because of the emphasis on the interior of the home being
protected and intimate details being discovered. If a thermal imager's
ability to discover the time of a daily bath is too intimate, the fact that
use of these devices' microphones can lead to overhearing much more
private details than just bath time would likely necessitate a finding
that it is too intimate as well.
Consequently, the history of the Supreme Court's Fourth
Amendment decisions indicate that these technologies will be covered
by the Fourth Amendment and require the government to obtain a war-
rant before using them for surveillance purposes. Under Katz, the
Fourth Amendment can protect what someone seeks to maintain pri-
vate by excluding the "uninvited ear." 78 These technologies would also
satisfy Justice Harlan's test described in his Katz concurrence, which
has since been heavily relied upon.7 9 There would almost undoubtedly
be a subjective expectation of privacy in these devices as one does not
expect the government to listen in on conversations through their tele-
visions or gaming consoles. Likewise, the expectation of privacy is ob-
jectively reasonable because of the prevalent and pervasive idea that
people are free from government eyes and ears while in their own
homes. Lastly, as mentioned above, Kyllo could be relied upon to grant
741 d. at 35.
71 Id. at 38.
761 Id. at 34.
7 7 Id. at 40-41.
7 8 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
7 Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).
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protection given the intimate nature of details that may be discovered
by listening in on conversations taking place in the home. Should states
attempt to legislate electronic eavesdropping regarding these devices,
Berger gives good guidance on what will be considered unconstitu-
tional.
IV. CORPORATE LISTENING
A. The Problem of Corporate Listening: The Samsung Smart TV
Scandal and the State ofPrivacy Policies
When people buy a new gadget, most rush home to install and
start using it; they are not running home to tear open the privacy policy
and start reading. People's tendency to (at most) skim over these poli-
cies is especially worrisome in the technological context because peo-
ple are almost always opting to ive up data about themselves and their
usage of that service or device.
In 2015, Samsung made headlines not just for its latest cell
phones, but for its privacy policy regarding the Samsung Smart TV.
Samsung's policy warned Smart TV owners to: "Please be aware that
if your spoken words include personal or other sensitive information,
that information will be among the data captured and transmitted to a
third party through your use of Voice Recognition."82 News outlets
quickly began comparing that portion of the privacy policy to the
telescreens featured in George Orwell's 1984.83 It only took a few days
for Samsung to amend its policy's terms. 8 4 Samsung amended the pol-
icy to the following:
If you enable Voice Recognition, you can interact with your
Smart TV using your voice. To provide you the Voice Recognition
feature, some interactive voice commands may be transmitted (along
with information about your device, including device identifiers) to a
third-party service provider (currently, Nuance Communications, Inc.)
80 Devin W. Ness, Information Overload: Why Omnipresent Technology and
The Rise ofBig Data Shouldn't Spell the End For Privacy As We Know It, 31 Cardozo
Arts & Ent. L. J. 925, 930 (2013).
81 See, e.g., Andrew Griffin, Samsung smart TV policy allows company to listen
in on users, THE INDEPENDENT (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-
style/gadgets-and-tech/news/samsungs-new-smart-tv-policy-allows-company-to-
listen-in-on-users- 10033012.html.
82 Lomas, supra note 8.
83 See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 81.
84 See Chris Matyszczyk, Samsung changes Smart TV privacy policy in wake of
spying fears, CNET (Feb. 10, 2015, 12:35 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/sam-
sung-changes-smartty-privacy-policy-in-wake-of-spying-fears/.
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that converts your interactive voice commands to text and to the extent
necessary to provide the Voice Recognition features to you. In addi-
tion, Samsung may collect and your device may capture voice com-
mands and associated texts so that we can provide you with Voice
Recognition features and evaluate and improve the features. Samsung
will collect your interactive voice commands only when you make a
specific search request to the Smart TV by clicking the activation but-
ton either on the remote control or on our screen and speaking into
the microphone on the remote control.8
Additionally, Samsung alerted its users that they could opt out
of Voice Recognition if any privacy concerns remained. 86 The irony,
of course, is that people likely bought Samsung's Smart TV because
they wanted the ability to control their televisions by voice recognition
commands, they just failed to consider that the television's micro-
phones may capture anything said around it.
Samsung's scandal is but one instance of new technologies cre-
ating privacy concerns for users who likely never considered the po-
tential downside of convenience. As one writer put it, "[t]he technol-
ogy industry is increasingly asking consumers to make a choice that
treads the line between cool and creepy, as companies prompt us to
trade our personal information in exchange for convenience and ser-
vices."87 People love the technological convenience of being able to
control electronics by voice commands, but are far less keen on the
prospect of companies overhearing them do so. This paradox puts
companies like Samsung in a tough spot; how are they supposed to
contribute to the future of the Internet of Things, where things are so
easily controlled by voice commands, and still assuage people's fears
that the companies are listening? By virtue of being voice-controlled,
the device must necessarily be listening and be able to transmit that
data back to the company to decipher the request and respond accord-
ingly. This makes sense, but is often not considered and understood by
the users of these devices.
85 Samsung Privacy Policy-SmartTV Supplement, SAMSUNG, http://www.sam-
sung.com/sg/info/privacy/smarttv.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2017).
86 Id.
8 Donna Tam, Our devices are listening to us all the time-but do we care?,
CNET (Nov. 16, 2014, 4:00 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/our-devices-are-lis-
tening-to-us-all-the-time-but-do-we-care/.
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1. Privacy Policies for Samsung, Amazon, and Microsoft
Microsoft's privacy policy explains what features can be ena-
bled by the camera and microphones in the Xbox Kinect device. With
regard to the microphones, the policy states that it can be used to chat
with other players during games, give commands for the console,
games or apps, and run searches.8 The only section dealing with the
voice data is surprisingly short given the length of the entire document.
Microsoft simply states, "[w]e collect, and use for service improve-
ment, voice search requests or samples of voice commands occurring
while using Kinect. These data are stored separately from your Xbox
profile." 90
The privacy policy for Amazon Echo is fairly concise, but adds
quite a bit through the incorporation of Amazon's general Conditions
of Use and Privacy Notice. 91 With regard to the voice commands a user
can give to Amazon Echo, the statement informs users that the device
streams the audio to the cloud, processes it, then retains "voice input
and other information, such as music playlists..." in the cloud. 9 2 The
frequently asked questions section of Amazon Echo's product page in-
forms users that they have the option of turning off the microphones,
but such information is left out of the privacy statement. 9 3 Amazon's
general privacy policy states that the company does not sell infor-
mation about customers to others and shares it only in six outlined sit-
uations. 9 4 These situations were generally applicable to the regular use
88 Microsoft Privacy Statement, MICROSOFT, https://privacy.microsoft.com/en-
us/privacystatement (last updated Oct. 2015).
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Alexa Terms of Use, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/cus-
tomer/display.html?nodeld=2018097 4 0 (last updated: Aug. 19, 2015); Conditions of
Use, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?no-
deld=508088 (last updated June 22, 2015); Amazon.com Privacy Notice, AMAZON,
https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeld=468 4 96#GUID-
A2C397AB-68FE-4592-B4A2-
7550D73EEFD2 _SECTION_3F77537F901B4157BOCBD26834827652 (last up-
dated: Mar. 3, 2014).
92 Alexa Terms of Use, supra note 91.
9 See id.; see also Alexa and Amazon Echo FAQs, supra note 5. In Amazon's
frequently asked questions section, it informs owners that they can turn off the voice
command feature, but is quick to also inform owners that doing so may "degrade
your Alexa experience."
94 Amazon.com Privacy Notice, supra note 91.
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of Amazon - ordering items, for example - rather than the use of Am-
azon Echo. 9 5
Samsung's privacy policy for its Smart TV was discussed
above in regard to the scandal that surrounded it. The quoted section
was only in regard to the voice recognition feature of the television,
but made an important distinction for users. It clarified that Samsung
only collects the voice commands when a specific request is made by
clicking the activation button.96 This means that the predetermined
phrases one can make to the device are not collected by Samsung. 9 7 So
if a user decides to deactivate the voice recognition feature, he will not
lose the functionality of the voice commands all together. The policy
for the Smart TV also incorporates by reference the general Samsung
Privacy Policy.9 8 The general privacy policy was especially helpful as
it largely employed a clear, bullet-point format and as a bonus for Cal-
ifornians, included a special "Your California Privacy Rights" sec-
tion.99
2. Privacy Policies: The Best Practice
Despite making headlines for its suspect privacy policy, Sam-
sung's policy is the best practice. First, its readability was far superior
to Amazon's privacy policy. Amazon incorporated a lot by reference,
which required the user to click through several links to eventually
gather all of the information. Trying to track down all of Amazon's
policy pages made it hard to make sure everything was accounted for
and get a clear idea of what the policy was. In contrast, both Microsoft
and Samsung had one, concise page with all of the relevant infor-
mation. The policies for their many products (i.e., Microsoft Word,
Cortana, etc.) were clearly separated and easy to navigate through.
Second, even before Samsung amended its policy post-scandal,
its policy was not bad. Each of the devices' policies largely had the
same method of dealing with voice commands. In fact, the warning
Samsung gave that led to the scandal is true of all always-listening de-
vices; Samsung was just the only one to point it out. By virtue of being
voice-controlled devices, these technologies will overhear conversa-
tions around them. Additionally, the Samsung Smart TV was the only
95Id.
Samsung Privacy Policy-SmartTV Supplement, supra note 85.
97 Id.
98 Id.
9 Samsung Privacy Policy, SAMSUNG (Feb. 10, 2015), http://www.sam-
sung.com/us/common/privacy.html.
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one that allowed for continued use of the voice recognition feature af-
ter opting to disable it; users could still use a more limited range of
predetermined commands. The downside for Samsung was that it used
a third-party service provider, Nuance Communications, Inc., to re-
spond to the voice command. While this is not a huge deal, it might
matter to those who are already concerned with one company over-
hearing the various commands they give to their devices.
B. Government Seizing Data From Corporations
1. The Fourth Amendment and the Third-Party Doctrine
In 1979, the Supreme Court decided Smith v. Maryland
wherein a pen register was at issue.'oo The police were investigating a
series of harassing phone calls made to a victim and installed a pen
register on a suspect's phone. 0 1 A pen register records all of the phone
numbers dialed on a phone without overhearing any of the content of
the phone calls by measuring electrical impulses caused by dialing
phone numbers.' 0 The resulting phone records indicated that the sus-
pect was responsible for the phone calls, which was used as a basis for
a warrant to search his home and later used as evidence at trial.' 03 The
defendant argued that the evidence yielded from the pen register
should be excluded because its use constituted a warrantless search. 04
The Supreme Court held that the use of a pen register did not qualify
as a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. 0 5 The Court opined that
the entire set of privacy interests at stake in the case were held by the
phone company.106 People could not claim a privacy interest in the
phone numbers they dialed because they know that when they dial a
phone number, that number is conveyed to the phone company - a third
party. 0 7 Because someone else is getting that information, people can-
not expect that police will be prevented from obtaining those rec-
ords.1o
The Smith decision created a clear, bright-line rule that phone
numbers being dialed out have no Fourth Amendment protection.
100 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979).
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
1os Id. at 745.
106 Id. at 741.
107 Id. at 742.
108 Id.
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When read in conjunction with United States v. White, Smith suggests
that the Supreme Court intended to create a very robust third-party
doctrine. In White, the defendant was found guilty of various drug
charges after the prosecution introduced evidence of conversations the
defendant had with a government informant which had been overheard
using a radio receiver. 09 The Court opined that the Fourth Amendment
should not protect a defendant whose conversation has been recorded
or transmitted by an informant when the Fourth Amendment does not
protect a defendant who confides in a "trusted accomplice [who] is or
becomes a police agent.""t0 The Court reasoned that someone thinking
about or engaging in illegal activities must certainly realize that people
he speaks with might be reporting to the police."'
Justice Sotomayor's concurrence in United States v. Jones
strongly suggests there is potential for the Supreme Court to amend the
third-party doctrine in the future. Much like Justice Brandeis's dissent
in Olmstead, Justice Sotomayor's concurrence touches on how chang-
ing technology creates problems for existing Supreme Court case law.
Justice Sotomayor noted:
[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individ-
ual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily
disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill suited to the digital age,
in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to
third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks."ll 2
She also opined that people likely would not accept a world in
which companies gave the government a list of every website visited
in the last week, month, or year, without a warrant. To support this
proposition, Justice Sotomayor cited to Katz, where the Supreme Court
held that even if in a publicly accessible area, what a person intends to
keep private may be constitutionally protected."14
As it stands today, such an expansive third-party doctrine sug-
gests that users of always-listening technologies may not have much
of an argument to make when objecting to companies using infor-
mation yielded by these technologies. This does not bode well for the
future given that people are increasingly giving their information away
109 U.S. v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 747 (1971).
'
10 Id. at 752.
11 1 Id(
112 U.S. v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J. concurring) (citations
omitted).
113 Id.
114 d.
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to third parties at an alarming rate.' As applied to the Amazon Echo,
this particular issue was poised to have its day in court. In December
2016, it was reported that police in Arkansas were trying to obtain the
recordings on a suspect's Amazon Echo. 116 The man was charged with
murder after a friend was found dead in the suspect's hot tub following
a gathering at his house.' 17 The police used a search warrant to obtain
the Echo's data covering two days around the incident, which Amazon
reportedly only partially complied with by providing the account
holder's information and purchase history.' Amazon's statement was
that: "'Amazon will not release customer information without a valid
and binding legal demand properly served on us. Amazon objects to
overbroad or otherwise inappropriate demands as a matter of
course."' 119 As of February 2017, Amazon was refusing to provide the
account holder's Echo voice recordings based on First Amendment
protections. 12 0 However, the issue became moot in March 2017 when
the defendant agreed to allow the police to have access to the record-
ings.121 Amazon provided the requested data later that same day.122
2. The Uncertain Future of the Third-Party Doctrine
Circuit courts' discussions of the third-party doctrine evidences
reluctance at best and unhappiness at worst. Several circuits express
uneasiness about applying a relatively antiquated doctrine in modem
times. Recently, two circuits have changed stances on the third-party
doctrine when rehearing cases en banc.
115 See, e.g., Saul Hansell, Zuckerberg's Law of Information Sharing, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 6, 2008, 7:03PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/06/zucker-
bergs-law-of-information-sharing/?_r-O. In 2008, Mark Zuckerberg predicted that
people will continue to share twice as much information about themselves as they
did the year before.
116 See, e.g., Alina Selyukh, As We Leave More Digital Tracks, Amazon Echo
Factors in Murder Investigation, NPR (Dec. 28, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sec-
tions/alltechconsidered/2016/12/28/507230487/as-we-leave-more-digital-tracks-
amazon-echo-factors-in-murder-investigation.
117 Id.
118 Id.
I9 d.
20 Jeff John Roberts, Amazon Argues Free Speech in Alexa Murder Case,
FORTUNE (Feb. 23, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/02/23/amazon-free-speech-
alexa-murder/.
121 Eliott C. McLaughlin, Suspect OKs Amazon to hand over Echo recordings in
murder case, CNN (Mar. 7, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/07/tech/amazon-
echo-alexa-bentonville-arkansas-murder-case/.
122 Id.
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In 2014, the Eleventh Circuit decided United States v. Davis
and held that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in cell-site
location information despite the third-party doctrine.1 2 3 Consequently,
it held that obtaining such information without a warrant violates the
Fourth Amendment. 24 However, rehearing the case en banc one year
later, the Eleventh Circuit reversed course and held that the defendant
expressly did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in such data
because of the third-party doctrine. 12 In Circuit Judge Rosenbaum's
concurrence, he opined that the dissent was right to be concerned be-
cause, "[i]n our time, unless a person is willing to live 'off the grid,' it
is nearly impossible to avoid disclosing the most personal of infor-
mation to third-party service providers on a constant basis, just to nav-
igate daily life."l1 2 6 However, he noted that, "[s]ince we are not the Su-
preme Court and the third-party doctrine continues to exist and to be
good law at this time, though, we must apply the third-party doctrine
where appropriate."1 2 7 .
In 2015, the Fourth Circuit decided United States v. Graham in
which it also considered the issues of cell-site location information and
the third-party doctrine.' 2 8 The court held that the third-party doctrine
could not be applied to the cell-site location information because it is
not something that a phone user conveys to its provider, voluntarily or
involuntarily. 29 Consequently, the user does not assume the risk of
disclosing that information as it is generated regardless of the user's
participation.1 3 0 However, just as the Eleventh Circuit in Davis, the
Fourth Circuit reversed course when rehearing the case en banc and
held that the Fourth Amendment cannot protect the cell-site location
information due to the third-party doctrine. 131 Also just as the Davis
court, the Graham court expressed a sentiment of resignation by say-
ing, "unless and until the Supreme Court so holds, we are bound by the
contours of the third-party doctrine as articulated by the Court." it
went so far as to say that the third-party doctrine "increasingly feels
like an exception," as "[a] per se rule that it is unreasonable to expect
123 U.S. v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1217 (11th Cir. 2014), reh'g granted, 2014
WL 4358411 (11th Cir. 2014).
I24 id.
125 U.S. v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 511 (11th Cir. 2015).
126 Id. at 525 (Rosenbaum, J. concurring).
I27 id.
128 U.S. v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2015), reh'g granted, 624 Fed.Appx.
75 (4th Cir. 2015).
129 Id. at 354.
130 Id.
131 U.S. v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
132 Id. at 437.
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privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties seems un-
moored from current understandings of privacy."1 3 3
In 2016, the Seventh Circuit heard United States v. Caira
wherein it applied the third-party doctrine to I.P. addresses.1 3 4 The de-
fendant argued, inter alia, that the government should not have been
able to obtain his I.P. addresses from Microsoft.1 3 5 The court rejected
the argument and found that the defendant had no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in the addresses because he had shared them with Mi-
crosoft - a third party.136 It acknowledged that an attack on the third-
party doctrine was not new, but such arguments had not won the day
because "it is also true that '[t]he Supreme Court ... has twice rejected
[Caira's critique]. Until the Court says otherwise, these holdings bind
us."'1 3 7 As of November 2016, there is petition for certiorari docketed
with the Supreme Court for Caira.138
Whether it is Caira or a different case, the Supreme Court will
likely choose to hear a case dealing with the third-party doctrine rela-
tively soon. As technology continues to advance and even more infor-
mation is shared with corporations on a regular basis, dissatisfaction
with the third-party doctrine will continue. Given the previous doubt
cast upon the third-party doctrine by Justice Sotomayor in her concur-
rence in Jones and the begrudging way in which circuit courts apply it,
the Supreme Court may use a new case as an opportunity to at least
modernize the doctrine.
C. The Possibility ofProtection: California Assembly Bill 1116
California recently enacted legislation dealing with the use of
voice recognition software in the home. On October 6, 2015, Governor
Jerry Brown approved Assembly Bill No. 1116, which became section
22948.20 of the California Business and Professions Code. The law
primarily accomplished three things: (1) requiring manufacturers of
connected televisions with voice recognition features to prominently
inform the user of such feature upon initial set up; (2) prohibiting such
manufacturers from selling or using for advertising purposes the col-
lected recordings of voice commands; and (3) prohibiting the compel-
ling of these manufacturers to incorporate specific features that would
133 Id.
134 U.S. v. Caira, 833 F.3d 803, 806 (7th Cir. 2016).
135 Id. at 807.
36 Id. at 809.
131 Id. (citation omitted).
138 See Id. at 803; United States Supreme Court Case Number: 16-6761.
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allow law enforcement to monitor conversations through the feature.1 39
The bill also prohibited a waiver of these provisions, limited the man-
ufacturers' liability to functionalities they provide at the time of the
original sale, and limited the scope of the protected voice recognition
data to that which is not processed locally.
The requirement that manufacturers inform users of the voice
recognition feature is a worthwhile provision, but likely does not do
much in terms of practical effects. Most consumers are aware of the
fact that their new smart television can be voice-controlled; it might
have even been the reason they bought it in the first place. The real
danger for this group is that they are so overjoyed with the voice com-
mand technology that they do not consider what the company or the
government might be doing with their recorded commands and result-
ing data. Even if people are unaware of the feature, the likelihood that
the consumers will read through all of the disclaimers, privacy agree-
ments, and litany of other warnings provided to them is slim to none.
Consequently, the two other main provisions are bigger accomplish-
ments with regard to privacy.
The first of these two provisions, as noted above, prohibits
companies from selling or using for any other advertising purposes the
recorded voice commands. The second prohibits manufacturers from
being compelled to include extra features that would allow for the
monitoring of conversations for law enforcement purposes. These are
more heavy-hitting than the first because they potentially assuage the
two problems with corporate listening that this paper sets forth: that
the corporations may abuse the data they collect and that the govern-
ment may use these devices to collect data on citizens. However, this
legislation is limited to "connected televisions" and while that covers
the problem presented here with regard to the Samsung Smart TV, it
does not account for the Xbox Kinect or Amazon Echo. Given that
there are many always-listening technologies other than smart televi-
sions already, and that many more will likely flood the market in the
coming years, this type of legislation needs to be more expansive in its
scope.
V. CONCLUSION
It seems clear that none of the privacy concerns addressed here
will prevent the public from.using these always-listening technologies
139 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §22948.20.
140 Id.
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today or in the future, though concerns may persist. The Samsung
Smart TV scandal was likely blown out of proportion as the possibility
of private conversations being overheard is a risk that comes with the
territory of owning always-listening technologies. Additionally, its pri-
vacy policy was the most coherent and upfront out of the three policies
applicable to the Samsung Smart TV, Amazon Echo, and Xbox Kinect.
Further, the Fourth Amendment would likely protect always-listening
technologies in the home if such a case presented itself to the Supreme
Court. Users have both a subjective and objectively reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in using the device. They are almost exclusively used
in the home and would consequently divulge intimate details to the
government similar to the situation in Kyllo. Whether the government
can seize information from the corporations is less certain. Justice So-
tomayor explicitly stated the third-party doctrine is ill-equipped to deal
with today's technologies, correctly opining that it may not remain ap-
plicable as more and more information is regularly disclosed to third
parties. Her concurrence in Jones seems to have planted to the seeds
of change, so to speak, at least for circuit courts. The Supreme Court
has changed its mind on Fourth Amendment privacy issues before, so
it is not farfetched to think that the Court may be willing to rethink the
third-party doctrine going forward.
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